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**THE U.S. NEEDS A BASE *WHERE??*: HOW THE U.S. ESTABLISHED AN AIR BASE  
IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC**



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## **THE U.S. NEEDS A BASE *WHERE??*: HOW THE U.S. ESTABLISHED AN AIR BASE IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC**

Before September 11, the U.S. had few interests in the little known Central Asian country of the Kyrgyz Republic, also called Kyrgyzstan. That situation changed when the U.S. needed a combat and logistics air base to support combat operations in Afghanistan. This paper will explain how U.S. Embassy Bishkek established and maintained a coalition air base in this geopolitically vulnerable, economically struggling former Soviet Socialist Republic. I will first outline U.S. interests in the Kyrgyz Republic before September 11 and the four main factors for Kyrgyz receptivity to the U.S. base proposal, which influenced how the U.S. shaped the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) negotiations. I will then turn to the importance of personalities, the collaborative process between the embassy and the base, and the embassy's management of the unavoidable culture clash between the U.S. military and the Kyrgyz. I will conclude by highlighting the base's impact on military operations in Afghanistan, bilateral relations, Kyrgyz relations with Russia and China, and Kyrgyz security, human rights and economy.

### **Why a base in the Kyrgyz Republic?**

In July 2001, I flew into Bishkek's sleepy Manas International Airport with my husband and two children to begin a two-year assignment at the U.S. Embassy as the Deputy Chief of Mission. As we drove with the ambassador toward town, dawn turned the stunning snowcapped mountain peaks south of the city pink, silhouetting figures on horseback herding sheep in roadside fields. I recalled the words of one visitor to Bishkek: "It isn't the middle of nowhere, but you can see it from there."

No one viewed U.S. interests as substantial in this land-locked, remote, impoverished land of only five million people. Russia was the most important Kyrgyz strategic partner, followed by China with the U.S. a distant third. The largest U.S. interest appeared to be trying to prevent the Kyrgyz Republic from becoming a failed state in a region that many saw as an arc of instability. Before backsliding on democracy, the Kyrgyz Republic had been called Central Asia's "Island of Democracy." Americans were invariably impressed by the refreshing openness and often overwhelming hospitality of the Kyrgyz. But despite impressive Kyrgyz economic reform attempts and its 1998 World Trade Organization membership, analysts questioned long-term Kyrgyz viability. Other than its incredible natural beauty, water and gold deposits, the country had few marketable natural resources. In 1999, two-thirds of Kyrgyz households were in poverty, with one-quarter in extreme poverty.<sup>1</sup> In 2000, Kyrgyz external debt was 135 percent of its GDP<sup>2</sup> and debt-service was on the verge of consuming one-third of GDP. The Kyrgyz even seemed unable to defend their borders when Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) terrorists struck in 1999 and again in 2000. Drug-trafficking and extremism were growing.

September 11, however, transformed the U.S.'s strategic worldview. The U.S. initially planned to support Afghanistan combat operations out of Pakistan. But relying entirely on Pakistan was "very problematic" in the words of Commander Craig Palmer, a Joint Chiefs of Staff Political-Military Planner for Afghanistan and Central Asia. The planners began looking for other land options.<sup>3</sup> Palmer credited his predecessor Commander Thom Burke for successfully focusing the Joint Chief of Staff Director for Plans and Policy on the possibility of creating bases in Central Asia. Because Burke knew the "lay of the land" from years of military-to-military projects and visits, he was able to "break loose the decision" to approach the Central Asians. Current Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) Afghanistan planner Lt Colonel Don Berchoff, who

was working in the Air Force's Tanker Airlift Control Center when the order came down to establish bases in Central Asia, commented that few could have imagined it possible.<sup>4</sup>

The U.S. first secured limited basing in Uzbekistan, the Central Asian country with the most pro-U.S. foreign policy and a shared border with Afghanistan. Commander John Volkoff, a Naval reservist who arrived for duty at Embassy Bishkek on October 14 as Central Command's (CENTCOM) Liaison Officer (LNO), remembered envying the CENTCOM LNO dispatched to Uzbekistan because CENTCOM was not interested in another base in Central Asia.<sup>5</sup> But despite proffered U.S. security assurances and the considerable assistance the U.S. had agreed to provide to Uzbekistan, the Uzbeks didn't agree to permit refuelers and bombers to be openly based out of the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) military base. Volkoff related that with U.S. forces decisively engaged in combat and in need of combat support, CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks was frustrated with Uzbek intransigence and decided to look for another base in Central Asia. Palmer explained that the Department of Defense (DoD) communicated its needs to the Department of State (DoS), which then "pinged" the U.S. Embassies in Central Asia on accepting airfield assessment teams.

U.S. Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic John O'Keefe<sup>6</sup> recalled that the Kyrgyz military was interested in having the U.S. use the rundown former Soviet bomber base at Kant, approximately fifty miles northeast of Bishkek.<sup>7</sup> However, Kant's shorter runways and swampy location could not accommodate large or heavy aircraft. After surveying all of the military airports in the region, the survey team<sup>8</sup> requested to assess the commercially-owned<sup>9</sup> Manas International Airport (MIA), twenty miles northwest of Bishkek. Ambassador O'Keefe contacted Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Transportation and Communication Kubanychbek

Jumaliyev, who allowed the survey to take place, but made no commitment on basing. (The ambassador added that Jumaliyev almost certainly checked with President Askar Akayev.)

The assessment team briefed CENTCOM that Manas was the best option, despite the longer flight from Bishkek to Afghanistan, because of Japanese-financed upgrades<sup>10</sup> to Manas' equipment and its almost 14,000-foot runways.<sup>11</sup> Basing in the Kyrgyz Republic would also give CENTCOM an alternate logistics hub; passengers could arrive via Europe on commercial flights while supplies could be sent by rail from Europe. Finally, some in the Pentagon savored the prospect of a robust U.S. presence in Russia's backyard. CENTCOM relayed to DoD, which communicated to DoS, that it wanted to use Manas. Commander Palmer described a "race" to see which country could provide the necessary SOFAs and overflight and landing clearances. Gas-and-go operations were established in Tajikistan<sup>12</sup> and Turkmenistan.<sup>13</sup> Each country, Palmer commented, was interested in getting U.S. money.

### **Why did the vulnerable Kyrgyz decide a coalition base was in their interest?**

Now that we have examined why the U.S. requested basing in a country of marginal pre-September 11 interest to the U.S., we should explore the four primary factors why the Kyrgyz, heavily dependent on Russia, agreed to U.S. basing: Kyrgyz sympathy after September 11 reinforced by their shared experience with terrorism and gratitude for previous U.S. assistance; strengthening U.S. diplomatic and military relations; Russian and Chinese acquiescence; and, Kyrgyz interest in greater international exposure, geopolitical leverage and economic benefit.

First and foremost, the Kyrgyz people were horrified by the tragedy of September 11. Ambassador O'Keefe vividly recounted President Askar Akayev's immediate telephone call, asking how the Kyrgyz could help. President Akayev also delivered to the embassy letters to

President Bush and to the American people, expressing his sadness and solidarity.<sup>14</sup> The Kyrgyz were generally pro-American and were shocked by the scale of the attack, especially since they had viewed the U.S. as all-powerful. Kyrgyz sympathy<sup>15</sup> was intensified by still raw emotions at having been victims of terrorists. During their 1999 and 2000 incursions, the IMU took hundreds of hostages, including Japanese, Americans and Germans and killed thirty Kyrgyz soldiers.<sup>16</sup> President Akayev often expressed gratitude for the millions of dollars of equipment and training the U.S. provided after the incursions to improve Kyrgyz capabilities. But official and public sympathy for the U.S. did not translate into overwhelming support for U.S. basing. In fact, in an October 2001 survey, only 55 percent supported the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan while 48 percent of Kyrgyz respondents advocated declaring neutrality.<sup>17</sup>

Second, U.S.-Kyrgyz bilateral relations were on the upswing thanks to creative diplomatic and key military initiatives. In late January 2001 following U.S. protests of flawed 2000 Kyrgyz parliamentary and presidential elections,<sup>18</sup> bilateral relations were at a low point. Ambassador O'Keefe secured State Department approval to approach President Akayev with a path to improve relations. "Contrary to what many think," the ambassador highlighted, "diplomacy is not being soft and nice. Diplomacy is being clear and specific in what makes a difference -- not whitewashing, but outlining what in the bedrock is crucial to relationship." In a difficult meeting with President Akayev, the ambassador stressed the opportunity to move forward with the new administration, listed key factors harming bilateral relations and pressed for democratic and economic reform.<sup>19</sup> While President Akayev was not immediately receptive, he listened. "Diplomats," advised O'Keefe, "need to be persistent." The ambassador's directness paid off when government harassment of opposition figures and media lessened. To give momentum to economic reform and develop personal trust, in March the ambassador proposed to President

Akayev that he create a high-level group<sup>20</sup> for strategic planning. The president supported the ambassador's initiative of inviting heavyweight international corporate leaders to develop a marketing strategy to capitalize on the Kyrgyz Republic's comparative advantages and to identify structural barriers to investment.<sup>21</sup> The ambassador's ensuing personal relationship with President Akayev and Kyrgyz top-level officials later proved vital to securing a base.

In addition to diplomatic relations, military relations were also strengthening. Following CENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zinni's lead, Franks visited Bishkek regularly,<sup>22</sup> military-to-military exchanges and U.S. assistance were growing, and Kyrgyz and U.S. officials conducted annual bilateral defense consultations. The Kyrgyz Republic was one of the few countries notified just before combat operations began in Afghanistan. Also, CENTCOM provided the embassy with sensitive daily intelligence briefings for the Kyrgyz on the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), bringing the relationship to a new level. This combination of sustained bilateral military engagement, assistance and personal relationships was also critical in assisting the pro-Russian Kyrgyz military to trust the U.S. basing request.

Third, Russian and Chinese acquiescence, albeit grudging, to basing was essential given Russian and Chinese political and economic leverage over the Kyrgyz. Even though Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first to call President Bush on September 11 and Russian-U.S. terrorism cooperation broke new ground,<sup>23</sup> President Putin never openly supported U.S. basing in Central Asia,<sup>24</sup> which was strongly opposed by Russian hard-liners and public opinion.<sup>25</sup>

Finally, because Kyrgyz public opinion was split, Kyrgyz relations with the U.S. were strengthening and Russia and China had not outright opposed basing, the Kyrgyz were able to consider their own interests. First, Kyrgyz officials wanted regional stability, urging the U.S. to stay the course to create lasting stability in Afghanistan. Geopolitical leverage was a second

factor. Presidential Investment Advisor Joomart Otorbayev told the ambassador that hosting a coalition base would thrust the Kyrgyz Republic onto the international stage. Both National Security Council Secretary Misir Ashirkulov and Defense Minister Esen Topoyev had been viewed as pro-Russian. The ambassador attributes Ashirkulov's critical support to President Akayev's approval and to Ashirkulov's probable conviction that a U.S. base would give the Kyrgyz more balance/leverage with Russia and China. Topoyev astonished the U.S. by his active behind-the-scenes measures to cut through the customary Kyrgyz red tape, most likely motivated by presidential sanction combined with pre-September 11 personal relations with Generals Franks and Zinni. Finally, the desperate Kyrgyz economic situation made officials and the public hope for potential economic benefits.<sup>26</sup>

### **How did USG approach the Kyrgyz to secure basing and assist coalition members?**

In early December, the Ambassador conveyed to President Akayev CENTCOM's interest in establishing a coalition Air Base. Four key issues arose during and after the negotiation of the SOFA. First, the U.S. assured the Kyrgyz military operations would not interfere with the operation of the civilian airport. Second, in a precedent for DoD, the U.S. agreed to pay landing and parking fees in accordance with International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards because Manas International Airport was owned not by the Kyrgyz government, but by a private joint stock company. Ambassador O'Keefe suspects that if the U.S. had steadfastly refused, the Kyrgyz side with its minority share in Manas might have forced the airport to forego the fees. But the ambassador realized that the revenue stream would be essential for keeping the Kyrgyz government committed to the base when complications undoubtedly arose in the future. (And indeed, with approximately \$7,000 paid per flight, airport officials and others were very

interested in keeping the SOFA in force when there was parliamentary discussion of terminating it after one year.) Third, the U.S. assented to Ashirkulov's demand that the base be completely open and transparent to preclude dangerous rumors and innuendo. The base led frequent tours for Kyrgyz officials, parliamentary deputies, media, interested citizens as well as for accredited ambassadors and defense attaches. After the SOFA was concluded, the U.S. in the spring of 2002 assured the Kyrgyz Republic that the base would only be used for OEF.

Within two days, the Ambassador and his team, supported by DoS and DoD officials, hammered out a joint SOFA text with the Kyrgyz. President Akayev met with the lower house, which passed the SOFA on December 6. Akayev convened the upper house in emergency session to ratify the SOFA on December 11<sup>27</sup> and signed the SOFA on December 14.<sup>28</sup> On December 15, the embassy received the Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) diplomatic note that the SOFA had entered into force. On December 16, Brigadier General Christopher Kelly, the commander of the 376 Air Expeditionary Wing, arrived in Bishkek<sup>29</sup> to establish the base in a muddy field across the road from the main airport building.<sup>30</sup> The base was named in honor of Peter J. Ganci, Chief of the New York City Fire Department, killed on September 11.<sup>31</sup>

Although commanded by a U.S. General, from its inception the base was a coalition base with, at times, only coalition aircraft. The French<sup>32</sup> and Canadians secured passage of their own SOFA. But since the Turks were the only coalition partner with an embassy in Bishkek, the legwork of coordinating and tracking the status of coalition SOFA's<sup>33</sup> as well as overflight and landing clearances with the Kyrgyz government fell to the U.S. The U.S. Embassy assisted the governments of the Netherlands,<sup>34</sup> Denmark,<sup>35</sup> Italy,<sup>36</sup> Spain,<sup>37</sup> Australia,<sup>38</sup> Norway,<sup>39</sup> Republic of Korea,<sup>40</sup> Turkey and New Zealand.<sup>41</sup> All deployed except Turkey and Canada,<sup>42</sup> freeing U.S.

aircraft and personnel for other missions and giving all coalition partners the invaluable experience of working as a coalition.<sup>43</sup>

### **Personality, Process, and Organizations**

In light of the extraordinary burden the base put on both Embassy Bishkek and the Kyrgyz government, John Volkoff repeatedly stressed the importance of *personality*, with key figures on both sides concerned about getting the job done and not who would get credit. After September 11, the embassy went into overdrive<sup>44</sup> and, despite the increased terrorist threat and authorized departure of dependents, was sent some outstanding augmentees.<sup>45</sup> In addition to the high-level Kyrgyz officials already mentioned, the base owed much to two mid-level Kyrgyz officials, whom General Franks recognized in August 2002: MFA Desk Officer Samargul Borbieva<sup>46</sup> who with single-minded dedication skillfully shepherded the U.S. and coalition SOFAs through the labyrinthine Kyrgyz bureaucracy<sup>47</sup> and later helped resolve the dozens of base problems that arose, and Ministry of Defense (MoD) Major Kosmos Ibrayev,<sup>48</sup> the invaluable day-to-day MoD liaison with the base. Volkoff marveled at how strong personal relationships at all levels allowed issues to be resolved through personal diplomacy, with diplomatic notes used only to record officially the understandings already reached.

Base commanders credited the Embassy for the base's existence and unanimously lauded the embassy's coordination *process*. From day one, the general and his key staff attended embassy interagency country team meetings to take advantage of possible synergies and attempt to resolve issues before they became problems. The base commanders, on the ground for an average of ninety days, almost always implemented the embassy's strategy for working with the Kyrgyz government, shaping public opinion and cultivating foreign diplomatic and military

representatives. In addition to the political and military collaboration already described, the embassy's Regional Security Officer (RSO) and other embassy security specialists daily shared threat information and contacts and backstopped each other, with base assets occasionally supplementing embassy security. The embassy's Public Affairs Office (PAO) and Base Public Affairs consulted on trends and strategy, jointly crafted responses, and conducted press and public events to shape public opinion. The embassy's Management Section provided the base with advice and assistance on contracting, operating, health and banking issues, while the embassy gained access to outbound mail, emergency medical care and the base exchange. Embassy security, military, economic, public affairs, democracy and education, health, humanitarian and other assistance programs were harnessed to support the base.<sup>49</sup> In summary, the embassy and base operated not as two or more organizations, but as one, with strong partners in critical parts of the Kyrgyz government.

With each successive ninety-day rotation of base personnel, the embassy (primarily Volkoff) had to reconvey vital institutional knowledge. Volkoff commented that some newly arrived base officers had trouble understanding that they could not expect the same operating environment that they had in the U.S. Ambassador O'Keefe observed that the generals who were the most successful were those who reached out to the Kyrgyz to craft mutually beneficial solutions and to conduct active public relations to gain public support. Public relations were especially important because of negative Russian media coverage and the Russian Embassy's attempts to generate negative publicity in the Kyrgyz Republic.<sup>50</sup>

Unfortunately, the scope of this paper does not allow me to describe the many challenges that faced the base after its establishment and how we resolved them. Two elements, however, were at the root of virtually every challenge, making the embassy's management role critical:

perceived geopolitical competition and the *organizational* clash between the U.S. need-it-yesterday U.S. military and the byzantine, decision-averse Kyrgyz bureaucracy.<sup>51</sup>

Russian and Chinese official ambivalence about the U.S. presence in Central Asia efforts soon turned into behind-the-scenes pressure on the Kyrgyz. Russian concerns<sup>52</sup> about U.S. intent were fanned by a January 2002 New York Times report quoting Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz that the political purpose of the bases and increased exercises in Central Asia might outweigh their military function.<sup>53</sup> The State Department and General Franks tried to assuage Russian sensitivities by highlighting the non-permanent nature of the base.<sup>54</sup> Not reassured, the Russians began conducting intense discussions with the Kyrgyz, resulting in the October 2003 “permanent” basing at Kant of Russian Rapid Reaction forces under the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.<sup>55</sup> The Chinese are reported to have pressured the Kyrgyz in 2002 to reduce support for the base.<sup>56</sup> In addition, Commander Palmer pointed to Chinese moves to strengthen the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which some see as a regional counterweight to U.S.-led groupings.

Russian and Chinese pressure on the Kyrgyz was only part of the challenge of operating in the Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz had never hosted anything remotely like the coalition Air Base. Kyrgyz bureaucracy was structured to discourage officials from taking initiative. As a result, all but the most clear cut matters had to be bucked up to extraordinarily high levels for decision, a time-consuming and aggravating process. In addition, resolution of the few clear-cut matters was occasionally delayed by government officials who had not received the supplementary remuneration or favors they expected. It took a long time for the Kyrgyz to get used to the fact that the base did not pay bribes or award non-competitive contracts. Many Kyrgyz criticized the base’s multi-million-dollar fuel contract with the president’s son-in-law’s

company.<sup>57</sup> However, in the next round of bidding, the contract was awarded to a lower bidder, who encountered no problem in delivering fuel. The country's high unemployment and poverty made many see the base as a potential cash cow, particularly in surrounding villages most affected by the twenty-four-hour roar of jet engines, damaged roads and invasive security patrols. It took months to get the green light to build a Munitions Storage Area in the spring of 2002 as well as to lease additional land<sup>58</sup> in the spring of 2003. In both cases, the ambassador had to exploit his personal relationships and not be shy about indicating that he did not want CENTCOM to pursue other basing options in Central Asia if we couldn't come to a mutually acceptable solution.

### **Conclusion - So What Difference Did the Ganci Air Base Make?**

Organizational collaboration, a fortunate combination of personalities, and a deft process all combined to establish the Ganci Air Base, advancing U.S. interests and garnering accolades from far and wide for Embassy Bishkek. In fact, Palmer commented that because of the success of the interagency coordination, it was used as a model for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The impact of the base has largely been positive. First, although not much ordinance has been dropped in the base's two years of existence, coalition troops on the ground in Afghanistan were safer because Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters could see the planes in the sky. Bishkek's role as a transportation hub and cross-shipment point has also been important for OEF. Second, U.S.-Kyrgyz bilateral relations are stronger. The base led to scores of high-level visitors to Bishkek, President Akayev's first official visit to the United States and increased assistance money. U.S. security and law enforcement cooperation is closer. Third, in addition to the tens of millions of dollars the base has spent on the local economy, hundreds of jobs created, and boost to the

tourism and service industries, the U.S. supported greater IMF and World Bank involvement in the Kyrgyz Republic as well as Paris Club debt restructuring.<sup>59</sup>

However, there were two negative consequences. Some in the Kyrgyz government calculated the U.S. need for the base would make us less vocal about human rights violations, leading to a dramatic deterioration in democratic reform, despite unabated U.S. pressure.<sup>60</sup> In addition, although security threats from Afghanistan have subsided, the IMU<sup>61</sup> has become more active in the Kyrgyz Republic, including three terrorists arrested in November 2003 for plotting to attack the base. Islamic extremist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, which has lambasted Kyrgyz officials as Western slaves for supporting the U.S. base, has also gained adherents.

Although the Kyrgyz have only granted permission for the base to conduct OEF-related activities, some in the Pentagon would like to keep the base long-term for geopolitical reasons.<sup>62</sup> The Kyrgyz are still under considerable Russian influence, as demonstrated by their initial stance on Iraq and statements made during the establishment of the Russian base at Kant, and most probably Chinese pressure. If rumors are serious that the Chinese may be interested in a base,<sup>63</sup> the Kyrgyz Republic would become the only country in the world with U.S., Russian and Chinese bases.

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- <sup>2</sup> The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Profile Kyrgyzstan 2001/2002 – External Sector: Capital Flows and Foreign Debt,” 18, <[http://db.eiu.com/report\\_full.asp?valnum=CPBKGC&title=Country+Profile+Kyrgyzstan](http://db.eiu.com/report_full.asp?valnum=CPBKGC&title=Country+Profile+Kyrgyzstan)>, via NDU library subscription, January 9, 2004.
- <sup>3</sup> CENTCOM was anxious to have land options since conducting operations from carriers is much more expensive than from land and entails significantly more wear and tear on equipment and people. In addition, planes would have had to refuel more than twice to get to and from carriers.
- <sup>4</sup> Lt Colonel Don Berchoff, telephone conversation with author, January 8, 2004.
- <sup>5</sup> This reference and all subsequent references from Commander John Volkoff, meeting with author, January 8, 2004.
- <sup>6</sup> This reference and all subsequent references from Ambassador John O’Keefe, meeting with author, December 10, 2003.
- <sup>7</sup> The ambassador assumed that General Esen Topoyev, Kyrgyz Minister of Defense, checked with Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev before permitting the assessment to take place.
- <sup>8</sup> Two survey teams were sent: one headed by a Turkish General to Tajikistan and a second headed by a Dutch Air Force Colonel to the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan.
- <sup>9</sup> Manas International Airport (MIA) is owned by a commercial entity with a minority Kyrgyz government stake. For more information, please see Manas International Airport, <<http://www.airport.kg/eng/>> (January 12, 2004).
- <sup>10</sup> Joint Report on Japanese ODA Loan, “Bishkek-Manas International Airport Modernization Project,” <[http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/oec/post/2003/pdf/2-30\\_full.pdf](http://www.jbic.go.jp/english/oec/post/2003/pdf/2-30_full.pdf)> (January 11, 2004).
- <sup>11</sup> The runways were built in the early 1970’s to enable Soviet bombers to strike China. For more information on Manas, please see Global Security.org, “Manas International Airport, Ganci Air Base, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan,” <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/manas.htm>>, (January 10, 2004). This site also includes some photos of Ganci Air Base.

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<sup>12</sup> “Tajikistan Opens Airport For U.s. Humanitarian Cargos,” On-line Pravda, November 28, 2001, <<http://english.pravda.ru/cis/2001/11/28/22332.html>> (January 12, 2004) reported that “The Kulyab airport, Tajikistan, opens for US humanitarian deliveries to Afghanistan, Talbak Nazarov, Tajik Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced after a foreign-ministerial conference of Collective Security Treaty countries. It is not yet a working arrangement but mere understanding, he added. Tajikistan previously opened its frontiers for US air transits. American aircraft can use Tajik airports for emergency landings and other necessities.” Also see “Central Asia Report - Central Asian States Offer Bases For European, Canadian Warplanes,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 29, 2001, Volume 1, Number 19, <<http://www.rferl.org/centralasia/2001/11/19-291101.asp>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>13</sup> For a description of U.S. basing in each country, please see Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy J.D. Crouch II, “Defense and Security Cooperation in Central Asia,” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus Committee on Foreign Relations, June 27, 2002, <<http://www.defenselink.mil/dodge/lrs/docs/test02-06-27Crouch.rtf>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>14</sup> President Akayev echoed these sentiments during his joint press conference with visiting Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, reported by the U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, “U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Reaffirm Friendship – Joint Press Conference with President Akayev, Secretary Rumsfeld,” April 28, 2002, <<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/text/0428rmfd5.htm>>, (January 11, 2004).

<sup>15</sup> The embassy received thousands of letters, telegrams and telephone calls and for weeks, the front gate was adorned with flowers left by hundreds of visitors.

<sup>16</sup> For a description of the 1999 and 2000 IMU incursions, see Rafis Abazov “Democracy Trapped,” Country Files: Kyrgyzstan: Annual Report 1999, <<http://archive.tol.cz/countries/kyrar99.html>> (January 11, 2004) and “Can We Correct Democracy,” Country Files: Kyrgyzstan: Annual Report 2000, <<http://archive.tol.cz/countries/kyrar00.html>> (January 11, 2004). The incursions are also covered by Jim Nichol, “IB93108: Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress: May 18, 2001, <<http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/international/inter-76.cfm?&CFID=12036524&CFTOKEN=42691133>> (January 12, 2004). For a description of the effect of the incursions on the Kyrgyz military, please see Igor Grebenshchikov, “Kyrgyz Army in Crisis,” RCA Number 44, March 14, 2001, <<http://lists.partners-intl.net/pipermail/women-in-war/2001-March/000308.html>> (January 11, 2004).

<sup>17</sup> “Central Asia Report – Central Asian Popular Support of America May Be Shaky,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty vol. 1, no. 15 (November 1, 2001), <<http://www.rferl.org/centralasia/2001/11/15-011101.asp>> (January 11, 2004).

<sup>18</sup> Please see the U.S. Department of State, “Kyrgyzstan – Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000,” <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/807.htm>> (January 11, 2004).

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<sup>19</sup> Ambassador O’Keefe specifically told President Akayev that the Kyrgyz Republic needed to let up on harassing the opposition. Pressure on opposition figures had to stop, imprisoned opposition presidential candidate Kulov needed to have a fair trial, and the government must stop closing and/or bankrupting opposition media, including Moya Stolitsa. In addition, economic reform had to move forward.

<sup>20</sup> Including only the President, Prime Minister, Investment Advisor, multilateral bankers, and U.S. and German Ambassadors.

<sup>21</sup> For more detailed information, please see Erkin Nusurov, “Kyrgyz Government Takes Foreign Investment Seriously,” Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States (BISNIS), September 2001, <[http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/011002rtable\\_kg.htm](http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/011002rtable_kg.htm)> (January 12, 2004) and Erkin Nusurov, “Kyrgyz Republic Rethinks Attracting Investors,” Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States (BISNIS), November 2001, <<http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/BISNIS/BULLETIN/0111Bull5.htm>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>22</sup> For references to previous engagements by General Franks during visits, please see on-line Pravda, “US May Provide Military Aid to Kyrgyzstan to Combat Islamic Militants,” May 17, 2001, <<http://english.pravda.ru/usa/2001/05/17/5457.html>> (January 11, 2004). For visits post-September 11, please see U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, “Fight Terrorism Globally, Simultaneously, Gen. Franks Says,” January 23, 2002, <<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02012407.htm>> (January 11, 2004) and U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, “Franks Calls Kyrgyz Republic Role Key in Anti-Terror Campaign,” August 23, 2002, <<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02082301.htm>> (January 11, 2004).

<sup>23</sup> For an example, please see the October 2001 U.S.-Russian joint statement on counterterrorism, please see George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin - Joint Statement on Counterterrorism by the President of the United States and the President of Russia,” Shanghai, October 21, 2001, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011022-11.html>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>24</sup> On September 24, 2001, Russian television broadcast Putin’s statement that “Russia is supplying and intends to continue to supply all the information we have about the infrastructure and the location of international terrorists and their training bases. Second, we are ready to offer Russian airspace for airplanes with humanitarian aid for the region where the antiterrorist action will be carried out. Third, we have agreed on this position with our allies, including Central Asian states.” RFE/RL reported that Russian military commentator “Pavel Felgenhauer says Putin’s speech can be seen not as a victory but as a setback for U.S. military plans to hunt down bin Laden. He says despite seeming to offer cooperation, Putin made categorical statements that would appear to limit American military involvement. He explains: “Well, [Putin made] a clear statement that the United States military is not welcome in Central Asia, and that Russia will do its best to prevent any American military presence in the area.”” Quotes from Tony Wesolowsky, “Russia: Putin Offers Russian Cooperation -- But How Much?,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 25, 2001,

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<<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/09/25092001124832.asp>> (January 12, 2004). In addition, “Russia Calls Collective Security Partners For Anti-Terror Teamwork,” On-line Pravda, November 28, 2001 <<http://english.pravda.ru/cis/2001/11/28/22308.html>> (January 12, 2004) reported “In its contacts with the USA and other anti-terror crusaders, Russia makes it a point to thoroughly reckon with the interests of its partners on the Collective Security Treaty (CST), said Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, as he was opening a foreign-ministerial conference of the treaty signatories--Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Mr. Ivanov highlighted a dynamic Russian dialogue with a great many countries on an extensive range of anti-terror issues. Ties with its CST partners retain an essential importance to Moscow in such activities, he pointed out. The minister stressed a necessity for practical action to step up foreign political partnership in support of the current international anti-terror operation. The CST countries' teamwork on the world scene is of special importance now that the world has come to grips with new threats and challenges for a lasting campaign. The current situation demands thoroughly new forms and content of international contacts, said Igor Ivanov as he appealed to the Collective Security Treaty signatories for mutual confidence and openness.”

<sup>25</sup> For one of the more balanced examples of how many Russians saw U.S. basing in Central Asia, please see Yury Razgulayev, “The USA Came to Kyrgyzstan and Is Not Going to Leave,” Pravda On-Line, December 24, 2001, <<http://english.pravda.ru/cis/2001/12/24/24307.html>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>26</sup> Janyl Chytyrbaeva/Don Hill, “Kyrgyzstan: U.S. Troops And Dollars Are Mixed Blessings,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 27, 2001, <<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/12/27122001091617.asp>> (January 12, 2004) and Geert Groot Koerkamp, “US Boosts Military Presence in Central Asia,” Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep, February 15, 2002, <<http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/kyrgyzstan020215.html>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>27</sup> “1. More Us Aircraft Land At The Bishkek Airport,” RFE/RL Kyrgyz News, December 21, 2001, <<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/KYRGYZNEWS/message/978>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>28</sup> To understand how important President Akayev’s personal intercession was in accelerating the process, please see footnote 47.

<sup>29</sup> Lutz Klevevan, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia, excerpted on Atlantic Monthly Press website, <<http://print.google.com/print/doc?isbn=0871139065>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>30</sup> John Hendren, “U.S. Base Looks a Lot Like Home,” Los Angeles Times, April 4, 2002, <[http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-040402kyrgyz\\_0,2699871.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-040402kyrgyz_0,2699871.story)> (January 12, 2004) and Edmund L. Andrews, “Bustling US Air Base Materializes in the Mud,” New York Times, April 27, 2002, as cited by the website “Why War,” <<http://www.why-war.com/news/2002/04/27/bustling.html>> (January 8, 2004).

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<sup>31</sup> Capt. Kristi Beckman, "Air base in Kyrgyzstan Named After Hero," 376th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs - GANCI AIR BASE, Kyrgyzstan, February 14, 2002 cited by Air Force Link website, < [http://www.af.mil/news/Feb2002/n20020214\\_0250.shtml](http://www.af.mil/news/Feb2002/n20020214_0250.shtml)> (January 8, 2004).

<sup>32</sup> "Kyrgyzia Considers The Possibility Of Allowing French Aircraft To Be Based On Its Territory," On-line Pravda, November 26, 2001, <<http://english.pravda.ru/cis/2001/11/26/21966.html>> (January 12, 2004) reported "Bishkek is considering the possibility of allowing French air detachment to be based on its territory within the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. According to the press service of the French foreign ministry, the Kyrgyz authorities would discuss this request of the French government, heeding an entire range of regional and geopolitical factors. Besides, the republic is also to discuss its position with regard to the anti-terrorist operation and its participation in the anti-Taliban coalition. France intends to deploy six Mirage jet fighters on a military aerodrome of Kyrgyzia."

<sup>33</sup> "The governments of Australia and South Korea have reached Kyrgyzstan authorities requesting permission to deploy on its territory auxiliary military missions to be involved in the US-led anti-terror operation in Afghanistan. The request was handed over through the US diplomatic mission to Kyrgyzstan, a Kyrgyz foreign ministry source told RIA Novosti Wednesday. The two countries mean to deploy their medical and engineer units in the republic. The republican Security Council is considering the request at the moment, according to a source. Italy, Canada and France earlier requested the Kyrgyz leaders for deployment of their Mirage-2000 and F-16 aircraft but have not received any reply whatsoever from official Bishkek." Cited in "Australia, South Korea Request Kyrgyzstan To Deploy Auxiliary Military Missions In Its Territory," On-Line Pravda, December 5, 2001, <<http://english.pravda.ru/cis/2001/12/05/22957.html>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>34</sup> "Nieuwsberichten - Commando-overdracht Ganci Air Base in Kirgizië," Netherlands Ministry of Defense, November 20, 2002, <[http://www.mindef.nl/nieuws/nieuwsberichten/201102\\_overdracht.html](http://www.mindef.nl/nieuws/nieuwsberichten/201102_overdracht.html)> (January 8, 2004).

<sup>35</sup> "Uden mad og drikke duer helten ikke," FOV Nyhedsbrev nr.11, 2002, <<http://www.fov.dk/arkiv/nyhedsbrev/2002/11/Manas.html>> (January 8, 2004).

<sup>36</sup> Ten. Erminio Englaro, "Analisi Defenso - Enduring Freedom "Ganci Air Base", A Model Of Cooperation," - 5° Roa Italian Air Force, May 9, 2003, <<http://www.analisdifesa.it/articolo.shtm/id/2873/ver/EN>> (January 8, 2003).

<sup>37</sup> "Turkey Air Crash Kills Spanish Troops," BBC News, May 26, 2003, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2937584.stm>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>38</sup> "ANZAC legend live on in Afghanistan" Royal Australian Air Force News, May 9, 2002, <<http://www.defence.gov.au/news/raafnews/editions/4408/story07.htm>> (January 8, 2004).

<sup>39</sup> "Forsvarsministeren besøker norske styrker i Kirgisistan," Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2002, <<http://odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuelt/nyheter/010011-210073/index-dok000-b-n-a.html>> (January 12, 2004).

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<sup>40</sup> Republic of Korea Proposed SOFA text, January 3, 2002, <[http://61.72.226.18/inter\\_treaty\\_real.nsf/0/3DF65EB470503E0F49256BAE0029F8C8?OpenDocument](http://61.72.226.18/inter_treaty_real.nsf/0/3DF65EB470503E0F49256BAE0029F8C8?OpenDocument)> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>41</sup> Judith Martin, "Kyrgyzstan Presence," New Zealand Air Force News, October 2003, <<http://www.airforce.mil.nz/latestinfo/RNZAFNews/files/2003/oct03/Tuireport.pdf>> (January 8, 2004).

<sup>42</sup> The French deployed Mirage 2000D's, fueled by French and Australian KC-135's. These KC-135's also fueled U.S. carrier-based combat aircraft over Afghanistan. The Spanish, Dutch, Danes, Norwegians and later the New Zealanders provided C-130's. From April to October, the U.S. deployed two-seater Marine F-18's, with two engines to get them over mountains, supported by French and Australian KC-135's. The Koreans manned the hospital and the Spanish provided search and rescue helicopters. Before combat operations in Iraq, CENTCOM split its theatre, locating AF/CEN assets in Manas and making the C-130's located at K2 a detachment of Manas's 376 AEW. John Volkoff recalls that the Dutch-Danish-Norwegian EPAF deployment was very "twitchy," since the Kyrgyz Republic was their first major out-of-country deployment. However, they agreed to stay when the U.S. requested because they said they were learning so much about themselves and working with the U.S. and other coalition partners.

<sup>43</sup> All of the Ganci Air Base Commanding Officers stated at the end of their tour of duty that one of the most rewarding aspects of their time in the Kyrgyz Republic was the challenge of leading a coalition base.

<sup>44</sup> Visiting Assistant Secretary of State A. Elizabeth Jones told the Ambassador in January 2002 that she had been to fewer places with a stronger sense of purpose.

<sup>45</sup> in particular Volkoff, who was a native speaker of Russian.

<sup>46</sup> Borbieva had served two years in the Kyrgyz Embassy in Washington and then another two in the Kyrgyz Embassy in London.

<sup>47</sup> The following needed to happen for a SOFA to enter into force. Once a country and the Kyrgyz had agreed upon a text:

- the country had to deliver an original diplomatic note in English and in Russian bearing an embossed seal to the Kyrgyz MFA
- the MFA translated the SOFA text into Kyrgyz and circulated the SOFA in all three languages to the 15 government agencies and ministries with jurisdiction. Each agency and ministry had the right to provide commentary.
- Simultaneously, the MFA provided the SOFA text in all three languages to the lower house of Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee to get its preliminary feedback. At this point, the

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MFA often provided supplementary briefing material. The country's representatives could visit and brief parliamentary committees either before or during the committee hearings.

- Once all 15 government agencies and ministries with jurisdiction approved the SOFA, the MFA provided it to the Prime Minister's office for signature.
- Once the Prime Minister had signed, the MFA provided the SOFA to the three committees in the lower house of parliament with jurisdiction: Foreign Relations, Security and Defense.
- Once the SOFA was voted on by all three committees, it was passed to the Speaker of the lower house's office to be brought to the floor of the lower house.
- Once the lower house of parliament approved the text, it was sent to the International Affairs Committee of the Upper House.
- Once the International Affairs Committee of the Upper House held its hearing and voted the SOFA out, the SOFA went to the office of the Speaker of the Upper House.
- The upper house only met in regular session two to three times a year, so the SOFA would have to wait until a session was scheduled.
- Once the Upper House ratified the SOFA, it was sent to the President's office.
- Once the President signed the SOFA, it was returned to the MFA.
- Once the MFA sent the country's embassy a diplomatic note informing the country that the SOFA had gone through all the necessary procedures, the SOFA formally entered into force.
- Since this process could take months and the U.S. wanted coalition partners to deploy in a more timely fashion, the Embassy negotiated a compromise with the Kyrgyz government. On December 25, 2001, then Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Amanbek Karypkulov agreed with parliament that the SOFA could be considered to provisionally enter into force once it was voted out of the Foreign Relations Committee of the lower house, at which point, forces would be able to deploy.

<sup>48</sup> Ibrayev was an unabashed Americophile with good English, who was given unrestricted access at the base so he could troubleshoot.

<sup>49</sup> For a somewhat flawed account of security and other assistance provided just as the base was being established, please see "U.S. Military Deployment Begins At Kyrgyz Air Base," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Central Asia Report vol. 1, no. 23, December 27, 2001, <<http://www.mars.dti.ne.jp/~irmela/ManasAB.htm>> (January 8, 2004).

<sup>50</sup> For example, within hours after two women were seriously injured in a car accident by a car driven by a base officer, the mother of one of the victims told the base she was contacted by a Russian Embassy representative, who offered to publicize her criticism of the base. The mother

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refused because she felt base representatives were making every effort to look after her daughter's welfare and that her daughter would be fairly compensated in the future. To get a flavor of a report that was much more balanced than most, please see Alisher Khamidov, "Traffic Accident Prompts Scrutiny Of Us Military Role In Kyrgyzstan," *Eurasia Insight*, March 25, 2002, <<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032502.shtm>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>51</sup> These elements were present during the U.S. SOFA negotiations with the Kyrgyz. But President Akayev had resolved the geopolitical complications in his mind before the negotiations began. Also, the president's personal and continued involvement short circuited much of the bureaucracy, resulting in a SOFA from start to entry into force in less than two weeks, as compared to the months it would have taken, if it were concluded at all, if he had entrusted it to someone else. Please see footnote 47 for more detail.

<sup>52</sup> For an example of the concerns of some Russians, please see Sergey Ptichkin and Aleksey Chichkin, "Afghan Operation Leaves Russia 'Encircled' by US and NATO," *CDI Russia Weekly*, no. 190 (January 25, 2002 - posted 26 January 2002) from <http://www.cdi.org/russia/190-6.cfm> as cited by *Emperor's Clothes*, <<http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/encircle.htm>> (January 14, 2004).

<sup>53</sup> In January 2002, The New York Times reported "However many troops the Pentagon ultimately stations in Afghanistan and nearby, General Franks and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are looking to expand American military engagement by increasing technical support and training exercises with their counterparts in the region. "Their function may be more political than actually military," the deputy secretary of defense, Paul D. Wolfowitz, said in an interview. He said bases and exercises would "send a message to everybody, including important countries like Uzbekistan, that we have a capacity to come back in and will come back in — we're not just going to forget about them." Reference from Eric Schmitt and Janes Dao, "U.S. Is Building Up Its Military Bases in Afghan Region," *The New York Times*, January 9, 2002, <<http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline/2002/nyt010902.html>> (January 11, 2004).

<sup>54</sup> Russian daily *Izvestiya* reported that "On January 23, General Tommy Franks said that the Pentagon was not planning to build permanent military bases in Central Asia. U.S. Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage kindly elaborated that Washington considers this region Russia's sphere of influence. It seems that the Bush administration thinks that it is more important to preserve normal relations with Moscow than to expand its geopolitical interests to Central Asia. At least, this is what it says." Reference from Alexander Shumilin, "The U.S. State Department: Central Asia Is Russia's Sphere of Influence," *Izvestiya*, January 30, 2002: no 12, in RIA Novosti translation in Johnson's Russia List, no 6047, <<http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6047-3.cfm>> (January 12, 2004). For a comprehensive review of Russia's interests in Central Asia pre-September 11, 2001, please see Jim Nichol, "IB93108: Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests," *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*: May 18, 2001, <<http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/international/inter-76.cfm?&CFID=12036524&CFTOKEN=42691133>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>55</sup> For more information on Russian basing at Kant, please see Viktor Litovkin, “Why Russia Needs the Kant Base And Why Kant Needs Russia,” Pravda, September 30, 2003, <[http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/10984\\_kant.html](http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/88/354/10984_kant.html)> (January 12, 2004) and “Daily News Bulletin - Speech by President of Russia Vladimir Putin at the Russian Air Base, Kant, Kyrgyzstan,” Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Press Department, October 24, 2003, <<http://www.in.mid.ru/bl.nsf/0/fd3376b79a1442f243256dc90054b267?OpenDocument>> (January 12, 2004) and citations of various articles from the international press carried under the title “American and Russian dividing the Kyrgyz sky ! - Russian Military Returning Back to Kyrgyzstan after Years,” <<http://kyrgyzstan.com/article.html>> (January 8, 2004).

<sup>56</sup> The Heritage Foundation reported that Kyrgyz diplomatic sources in Washington privately confirmed that “...the week after Vice President Hu's visit to Washington, China pressured its Central Asian "allies," Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, to back away from their support of the U.S. Under pressure from Beijing, the Kazakhs scaled back offers of airspace and bases to American forces while the Kyrgyz did not.” From John J. Tkacik, Jr, “Time for Washington to Take a Realistic Look at China Policy – Backgrounder 1717,” The Heritage Foundation: December 22, 2003, < <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1717.cfm>> (January 12, 2004.)

<sup>57</sup> These allegations were covered in the Western press in Greg Jaffe, “Pentagon Prepares to Scatter Soldiers in Remote Corners,” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2003, as cited by the Center for Security Policy, <[http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=03-F\\_07](http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=03-F_07)> (January 12, 2004) and Robert G. Kaiser, “Difficult Times For a Key Ally In Terror War - Kyrgyzstan's Politics, Economy in Turmoil,” Washington Post, August 5, 2002, p. A09 as cited by American Councils/ACCELS, <[http://www.americancouncils.org/news\\_item.asp?PageID=73&NewsItem=61](http://www.americancouncils.org/news_item.asp?PageID=73&NewsItem=61)> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>58</sup> to relocate the base closer to the runways and provide better force protection.

<sup>59</sup> “Central Asia Report - Congressmen Study Basing Arrangement at Hanabad...and in Kyrgyzstan,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 7, 2002, vol. 2, no. 9, <<http://www.rferl.org/centralasia/2002/03/9-070302.asp>> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>60</sup> For additional detail on immediate developments, please Assistant Secretary of Jones’s press statement in “U.S. Grateful for Kyrgyz Support to Anti-terror Coalition - Development of Civil Society also Important, Jones Told Akayev” U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, January 25, 2002, <<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02012508.htm>> (January 12, 2004), an analysis by Kimberly Zisk Marten “Small Steps for U.S. Security Interests in Kyrgyzstan – PONARS Policy Memo #264,” Columbia University, October 2002, <[http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm\\_0264.pdf](http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0264.pdf)> (January 8, 2004) and Robert G. Kaiser, “Difficult Times For a Key Ally In Terror War - Kyrgyzstan's Politics, Economy in Turmoil,” Washington Post, August 5, 2002, p. A09 as cited by American Councils/ACCELS, <[http://www.americancouncils.org/news\\_item.asp?PageID=73&NewsItem=61](http://www.americancouncils.org/news_item.asp?PageID=73&NewsItem=61)> (January 12,

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2004). Later, the Akayev administration drafted a new Constitution substantially strengthening presidential power that was passed in a flawed referendum.

<sup>61</sup> “Russian Newspaper Reports Further On Arrest Of Three Kyrgyz Terror Suspects,” BBC, November 6, 2003 as cited by the Ar-Namys opposition party website <<http://www.ar-namys.org/en/view.php?i=446>> (January 8, 2004) reported that “A Russian newspaper has said the three terror suspects arrested recently in Kyrgyzstan had had training in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their mission was to blow up the Ganci air base, near Bishkek, which is used by US-led coalition forces.”

<sup>62</sup> In May 2003, the Wall Street Journal reported “To strike faster at these remote hotspots -- or prevent them from becoming hotspots -- Mr. Rumsfeld is pushing U.S. forces out of their big garrison bases in the U.S., Germany and South Korea, three countries that typically host more than 80% of the 1.4 million U.S. troops. Instead, he envisions a force that will rotate through a large number of bases scattered throughout the world in places including Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Singapore, the Horn of Africa and Eastern Europe. In some of these places, the U.S. might post a few dozen troops who would keep the base in good condition and maintain equipment for use by troops that occasionally arrive for training. In case of war, these forward bases could be used as launching pads for strikes elsewhere. Current bases in Romania, the Philippines or Kyrgyzstan might fall into this category.” Reported by Greg Jaffe, “Pentagon Prepares to Scatter Soldiers in Remote Corners,” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2003, as cited by the Center for Security Policy, <[http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=03-F\\_07](http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=03-F_07)> (January 12, 2004).

<sup>63</sup> Pepe Escobar, “Silk Road Roving – Part 4, Touching Base,” Asia Times On-line, <[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central\\_Asia/EK15Ag01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EK15Ag01.html)> (January 14, 2004).